A Model of Crisis Management by Li, Fei & Zhou, Jidong
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers Cowles Foundation 
12-4-2020 




Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Li, Fei and Zhou, Jidong, "A Model of Crisis Management" (2020). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 
2584. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2584 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at 
Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
 
A MODEL OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
By 
Fei Li and Jidong Zhou 
December 2020 
COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2266 
COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS 
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 208281 
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281 
http://cowles.yale.edu/ 
A Model of Crisis Management∗
Fei Li† Jidong Zhou‡
December, 2020
Abstract
We propose a model of how multiple societies respond to a common crisis. A gov-
ernment faces a “damned-either-way” policy-making dilemma: aggressive intervention
contains the crisis, but the resulting good outcome makes people skeptical of the costly
response; light intervention worsens the crisis and causes the government to be faulted
for not doing enough. This dilemma can be mitigated for the society that encounters the
crisis first if another society faces the same crisis afterward. Our model predicts that the
later society does not necessarily perform better despite having more information, while
the earlier society might benefit from a dynamic counterfactual effect.
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1 Introduction
Many crises can be contained or even prevented if proper measures are taken in a timely
manner. However, people are often uncertain about the severity of the threat, and they as-
sess a policymaker’s response only after seeing the consequences and updating their opinion
accordingly. This can pose a challenge to the policymaker: if an aggressive action is taken
and the crisis is prevented, people may then underestimate the severity of the problem and
view the costly aggressive action as unnecessary; if a less aggressive action is taken and
the crisis gets out of control, people may then blame the policymaker for not having taken
the necessary precautions. This leads to a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” policy-
making dilemma. Such a dilemma is relevant in a wide range of circumstances such as how to
respond to infectious diseases or terrorism threats, whether to take precautionary economic
measures to prevent a potential economic recession or financial crisis, or how to regulate
manufacturing or cyber-security.1 If policymakers are more concerned about being accused
of overreacting, they may then choose a light intervention even if they know the threat is
severe, resulting in an inefficient response.2
The dilemma would be resolved if the public could observe the counterfactual outcome
under alternative policies. This is possible if other jurisdictions or societies face a similar
threat but somehow respond differently. For instance, if one society acts aggressively but
the other does not, then if the crisis gets out of control in the latter society, the policymaker
in the former society can point to the bad outcome in the latter as justification for having
taken the aggressive policy.
In this paper, we argue that when multiple societies face a common crisis, they may
endogenously adopt distinct policies (even if they are otherwise identical), so that some
societies can escape from the policy-making dilemma. To illustrate the idea, we consider the
1In his State of the Union Address in 1962, President John F. Kennedy said, “The time to repair the roof is
when the sun is shining” to advocate his economic policy for preventing another recession. This was widely
supported as the country had just experienced the 1960 recession. Such preventive economic policies, however,
are often less popular when the economy is in a good state, as Christine Lagarde commented in her speech “A
Time to Repair the Roof” at Harvard University in October 2017.
2There is anecdotal evidence that the concern of being blamed for overreacting is well justified. For ex-
ample, in U.S. history of epidemics, neither Woodrow Wilson’s 1918 influenza pandemic failure nor Dwight
Eisenhower’s misguided response to the 1957 influenza pandemic was faulted. However, in 1976 Gerald Ford
was widely criticized and ridiculed thanks to his heavily publicized effort to prevent a new variant of in-
fluenza which turned out to be less deadly than expected. See Skidmore (2016) and Stasavage (2020). Also see
Healy and Malhotra (2009) for evidence that voters do not reward the incumbent presidential party for disaster
preparedness spending.
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case when societies handle a crisis sequentially, though, as we point out later, a similar idea
applies to the simultaneous-move case as well. When a society that encounters the crisis
first takes the precaution and the crisis is contained, the public in the subsequent society,
after seeing the outcome in the first society, may then become more optimistic. This boosted
optimism makes it harder for the policymaker in the second society to follow suit. Thus the
aggressive action in the first society can mislead the public in the second society and prevent
its policymaker from adopting the right policy. The resulting adverse outcome, however, can
then be used to justify the first policymaker’s initially unpopular policy choice. We refer to
this as a dynamic counterfactual effect.
A consequence of this counterfactual effect is that, all else equal, societies that encounter
the crisis later may handle it worse than early-hit societies. Later movers can learn from
earlier movers’ experiences, but having more information is not necessary a blessing: people
may become too optimistic after seeing good outcomes in early-hit societies. Conversely,
the early-hit societies, foreseeing the possible counterfactual from subsequent countries, are
more willing to adopt costly but more effective policies.
We develop a model of sequential crisis management to capture both the “damned-
either-way” policy-making dilemma and the dynamic counterfactual effect. The policy-
making dilemma relies on two modeling ingredients: each policy option is more likely
to yield an outcome that induces people to believe some alternative option would have
worked better;3 and the policymaker is held accountable for their policy after its conse-
quence is observed. Both are natural in the context of crisis control and prevention. Due to
the policy-making dilemma, it is possible that the policymaker panders to public opinion on
the severity of the crisis, causing a suboptimal policy choice. The dynamic counterfactual
effect further relies on the assumption that people in each society evaluate their policymaker
after observing policy consequences in all societies. This is plausible when the policy conse-
quence in each society is realized relatively quickly and is publicly observable.
An obvious application of our model is the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Every coun-
try’s government faces the policy-making dilemma due to the public’s initial uncertainty
about the severity of the virus. Since some countries were hit earlier than others, it makes
the dynamics across countries important. Our model provides a new angle to understand
the response disparity among societies, complementing a spectrum of possible explanations
from cultural differences to institutional heterogeneity. In particular, our model predicts: (i)
3This paper focuses on policies which can influence people’s judgment of the severity of the crisis. See
Section 5 for a discussion of another type of policies which aim to reduce the damage of a crisis after its
severity is already known.
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early-hit countries are less hesitant to adopt aggressive and precautionary measures such as
massive testing and tracking, mandatory quarantine and even lock-downs from the early
stage; (ii) subsequent countries face a stronger political hurdle to take strict measures; (iii)
the strict measures adopted by early-hit countries may be initially criticized, but later lauded
after the adverse consequences under alternative responses are observed.
There are other relevant examples. For instance, when a terrorism threat spreads interna-
tionally, governments need to decide, often in a sequential manner depending on where the
threat first emerges, how aggressively to tackle it when the public is initially uncertain about
its severity; trading off between free expression and public safety, a social media platform
or regulator often falls into a damned-either-way trap, but its hands can be untied by the
possible loose regulation and adverse consequence from other platforms or societies.4
To deliver the main idea transparently, we adopt two perhaps unconventional assump-
tions. First, we assume that the public does not believe that the policymaker possesses any
superior information on the true state (e.g., due to a mistrust) and so does not attempt to
infer information on the state merely from their chosen policy. In other words, the public
learns the state only from the policy outcome. This shuts down a potential signaling chan-
nel. However, we show in an extension that apart from an extreme case, adding the signaling
channel does not affect our main insight. Second, we assume that the public evaluates the
policy using their updated belief of the state after seeing the policy outcome. This is dif-
ferent from the usual approach where the public evaluates the policymaker based on some
underlying characteristics such as their competence or preferences which can be learned
from policy choices. We report such a “reputation” modelling approach in Appendix B and
show that it delivers similar results but with somewhat different underlying economics.
Finally, notice that although we choose the sequential-move model to deliver our main
message, the counterfactual effect is also present when societies make decisions simultane-
ously. In that case, asymmetric equilibria with different responses across societies or even
mixed-strategy equilibria can arise. For instance, if the policymaker in one society expects
the other to take an aggressive action, they then anticipate a more severe domestic policy-
making dilemma and so will be more hesitant to adopt the same policy. The policymaker
in the other society, anticipating a light action and so a counterfactual from this society, will
indeed take the aggressive action.
4Despite being criticized for “an act of modern totalitarianism,” many tech giants are waging wars to
counter the spread of disinformation, hate speech and extremism on social media. See, e.g., https://econ.
st/3e2FgmL.
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Related literature. With a single society, our model predicts that due to the policy-
making dilemma, the policymaker, in spite of knowing that the state is severe, may choose
a light intervention, appearing to pander to public opinion when people are initially opti-
mistic. This pander-to-the-prior effect is not new in the literature and can arise in various
contexts. For example, in the political economy literature, this can occur when an incumbent
politician tries to signal their competency (e.g., Harrington (1993), Canes-Wrone, Herron,
and Shotts (2001), and Prat (2005)) or preferences (e.g., Maskin and Tirole (2004)) by choos-
ing a policy which panders to public opinion. This also happens when a firm manager who
has a share price concern makes decisions the market wants to see (e.g., Brandenburger and
Polak (1996)), or when a media slants its report toward its readers’ prior to build a reputation
for quality (e.g., Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006)). Also related is the literature on the adverse
effect of reputation concern. In particular, Morris (2001) and Ely and Välimäki (2003) show
that an agent chooses Pareto-dominated information revelation or action to avoid damaging
their reputation.
The policy-making dilemma highlighted in our paper differs from the trade-offs in the
aforementioned papers. In those works, either the outcome of an action is unobservable, or
when an action matches the state, it is more likely to generate an observable outcome which
induces the agent to approve the chosen action. This is opposite to the “damned-either-
way” feature of our model: when a strict policy is adopted, a good outcome is realized more
likely regardless of the state, which makes people more optimistic about the underlying
state and so induces them to disapprove the chosen policy. Moreover, most of these works
do not consider a meaningful interaction among multiple decision makers. An exception is
Brandenburger and Polak (1996), which we will discuss in more detail in Section 4. But an
important difference is that in their model, having multiple sequential decision makers does
not restore the earlier movers’ incentives to take the efficient action.
The mechanism in our model with multiple societies is the resolution of the belief con-
flict between the policymaker and the public in a dynamic environment. Hirsch (2016) is a
related work in this respect. He studies a two-period model where a principal and an agent
initially disagree on the optimal policy to achieve their shared objective. If the principal
compromises in the first period and implements the “wrong” policy the agent favors, the
agent will then make more effort and eventually learns a more informative signal of the true
state. This helps them reach consensus and implement the optimal policy more efficiently
in the second period.5 This idea could also be relevant in our crisis management context:
5There are other works which study the interaction between learning and prior disagreement. For instance,
Che and Kartik (2009) argue that with conflicting beliefs, individuals will have more incentives to acquire in-
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the policymaker can take a light action first and let people learn the true severe state, and
then switch to an aggressive action. Such a trial-and-error way to resolve the belief conflict
can be rather costly, especially when policy experimentation is time-consuming or an initial
incorrect action could have a severe lasting adverse impact. Our model highlights a novel
channel to resolve the belief conflict, which is to let the agent learn from the failure of late
movers’ alternative policy choices.
In our model with multiple societies, strategic players may take some action which ap-
pears against their current interest but benefits them in the long run by generating infor-
mation that influences followers’ decisions.6 Broadly speaking, this insight is related to the
strategic experimentation literature. For example, Bolton and Harris (1999) study a strategic
bandit problem among multiple long-lived agents. Besides the standard free-rider effect,
they also discover an encouragement effect by which each agent has an incentive to exper-
iment more than in the single-agent case, in the hope of generating positive information to
incentivize other agents to experiment further in the future. Callander and Hummel (2014)
demonstrate that a politician holding on to power temporarily will use preemptive policy
experimentation to set the path of their successor’s experimentation in their favor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the benchmark case
with a single society and shows the policy-making dilemma. Section 3 studies the case of
multiple societies where the dynamic counterfactual effect arises. Section 4 discusses an
important extension, and Section 5 concludes. The omitted proofs and details are relegated
to Appendix A. Appendix B contains other extensions and an alternative model.
2 Single Society
Suppose that a society faces a potential crisis, and the crisis can be severe or mild. There
are two players: a policy-maker or government and a representative citizen. We assume that
the government has learned the true state, which is severe. The citizen, however, is uncertain
about the state, and believes that the crisis is severe with probability µ0 ∈ (0, 1) and is mild
with probability 1 − µ0. We assume that the government cannot convince the citizen of
the true severity of the crisis and fully resolve their opinion difference, and they agree to
formation to persuade each other. This can, for example, render hiring people with different opinions optimal
in organization design.
6In terms of dynamic information spillover across players, our paper is also related to the literature on
social learning. In the standard models in that literature (e.g., Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch (1992)), however, early players have no strategic incentives to influence later players’ choices.
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disagree. This assumption implies that the citizen does not believe that the government has
superior information on the state. Then the prior difference 1− µ0 can be regarded as the
citizen’s mistrust of the government.
The government has two possible options to handle the crisis: a ∈ {l, h}, where l stands
for a “low” action or light intervention, and h stands for a “high” action or heavy interven-
tion.7 An outcome, which can be good (denoted by x = 0) or bad (denoted by x = 1), will
be realized after the government takes its action. When the state is mild, we assume that
the outcome will be good regardless of the government’s action. When the state is severe,
however, the outcome will depend on the government’s action: x = 0 with probability qa
for a ∈ {l, h} where
0 ≤ ql < qh ≤ 1 ,
i.e., a high action generates a good outcome more likely.8
The citizen observes the government action and the outcome, and updates her belief
about the state by Bayes’ rule. Once a bad outcome occurs, the citizen will be convinced that
the state is indeed severe since a mild state always yields a good outcome.9 A good outcome,
however, will make the citizen more optimistic about the state. More precisely, after seeing
a = h and x = 0, the citizen’s posterior belief about the state is
Th(µ0) =
µ0qh
µ0qh + 1− µ0
,
where Th is a Bayesian updating operator. Similarly, after seeing a = l and x = 0, the
citizen’s belief is updated to
Tl(µ0) =
µ0ql
µ0ql + 1− µ0
.
It is clear that
Tl(µ0) < Th(µ0) ≤ µ0 . (1)
7For simplicity we assume here that the government takes action only once. In a more realistic setting, the
government is perhaps able to make decisions dynamically and the citizen then learns information on the state
over time. The high action here is a reduced-form way to capture an in-time response, while the low action
corresponds to a sluggish response which squanders the opportunity to keep the crisis under control while
allowing the citizen to learn more about the true state.
8In some examples (e.g., a pandemic), the citizen’s effort also matters for containing the crisis. A more
optimistic citizen may make less effort, making the government’s action less effective in controlling the crisis.
This can strengthen our main point in the two-society model later: making people in the second society more
optimistic will not only induce the government there to take the low action but also reduce people’s effort
there. This will increase the chance of a bad outcome in the second society and so more likely help justify the
first government’s choice of high action.
9As we will discuss in Appendix B, this assumption of bad-news information structure is not crucial for the
main sights of this paper.
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That is, seeing a good outcome realized when the action is low makes the citizen more op-
timistic than when the action is high. Also, Ta, a = h, l, increases in qa and approaches the
prior µ0 as qa goes to 1. That is, a good outcome becomes less informative when an action
becomes more effective in containing the crisis. The exact form of belief updating is not
important, and what matters for our subsequent analysis is property (1). Note that under
our agree-to-disagree assumption, there is no interim Bayesian updating after seeing the
government action but before seeing the outcome.
The citizen’s utility depends on the government’s action a and the outcome x:
u(a, x) = −c× Ia=h − x, (2)
where Ia=h is an indicator function and c > 0. A heavy intervention imposes a cost c on
the citizen, while a light intervention involves a lower cost, which is normalized to 0. When
the outcome turns out to be bad, the citizen further suffers a loss, which is normalized to
1. This double normalization makes c the cost difference between two actions relative to
the citizen’s disutility from the bad outcome. Relative to action l, action h imposes a cost
c regardless of the true state but generates a benefit qh − ql only when the state is severe.
Therefore, the citizen finds action h to be optimal if and only if she is convinced that the




To make our problem interesting, we assume henceforth c < qh − ql so that µ̂ ∈ (0, 1).
Under this condition, the first-best policy, given the true state is severe, should be heavy
intervention. It is easy to see that µ̂ increases in c and ql, but decreases in qh. Intuitively,
action h will be less favored by the citizen if it is more costly to enforce (higher c) or less
effective in containing the crisis (smaller qh − ql).
The government will be held accountable for its action after its consequence is observed.
The citizen will evaluate the government’s action according to her posterior belief, i.e., she
prefers to approve the government’s action if and only if it maximizes her expected utility
based on her updated belief µ. As a consequence, action h will be approved if µ ≥ µ̂, and
otherwise action l will be approved. We will discuss more about the citizen’s evaluation rule
later. The government cares only about the citizen’s evaluation (say, for the policy maker’s
political career such as reelection or personal legacy purpose),10 and its payoff is 1 if its
10This government preference specification applies not only in democracies but also in autocracies where
winning public support is critical for the government to legitimate and stabilize its governance.
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action is approved by the citizen and is 0 otherwise. The government’s objective is therefore
to maximize the probability that its action gets approved.11
Discussion. Before proceeding, we discuss two main modelling assumptions that enable
us to deliver the main insights in a parsimonious way.
(i) Non-common prior and agree-to-disagree. We assume that the government and the citizen
hold different priors of the state and agree to disagree.12 We interpret it as a consequence of
the citizen’s mistrust of the government. This mistrust prevents the government from con-
vincing the citizen of the true state. With this agree-to-disagree assumption, the citizen does
not infer any information on the state directly from the government’s action, and so there is
no signaling issue in our model. This simplifies the analysis, especially in the dynamic case
with multiple societies. For simplicity, we have also assumed that the government holds a
degenerated prior belief and know the true state for sure. In Section 4 we will discuss an
extension with the signaling channel and a more general prior and show that it delivers sim-
ilar insights though in a less concise way. We choose to use the model without signaling also
because we are inclined to believe that in many cases the public may not be sophisticated
enough to make inferences based on their conjectured government policy strategy.
(ii) Policy evaluation and political accountability. The more important assumption is that the
citizen uses her posterior of the state (after seeing the policy outcome) to evaluate the gov-
ernment policy. This is the source of the agency problem in our model (i.e., the government
may pander to public opinion and choose the inefficient policy).
One interpretation is that the citizen is purely an assessor of the government policy, and
she enjoys supporting the policy if it is optimal according to her posterior belief and de-
nouncing it otherwise. That the citizen uses her posterior, instead of her prior, to evaluate
the policy is related to the well-known hindsight bias: people tend to incorporate the newly
available information into their evaluation of a decision, even if they know that the infor-
mation was not available when the decision was made. This bias is widely documented in
the psychology and behavioral economics literature (see, e.g., Fischhoff (1975), and Camerer,
Loewenstein, and Weber (1989)), and is plausible in our context when people mistrust the
government.
11We will discuss a more general government payoff specification in Appendix B. For example, when the
government takes action h but a bad outcome is realized, it may suffer from being regarded as having a poor
enforcement ability. It is also possible that conditional on being disapproved, the government may have dif-
ferent payoffs, depending on whether it is criticized for overreacting or underreacting. We will show that our
main insights are robust to these possible generalizations.
12See, for example, Morris (1995) for a comprehensive discussion on the heterogeneous-prior assumption.
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Another interpretation is that the policy outcome in our model is just an informative
signal of the policy effectiveness realized in the beginning phase of the crisis. If the citizen
believes that her opinion of the policy will determine the government’s decision of whether
to continue the same policy or adopt a new one, it is then rational for her to evaluate the
current policy based on her posterior after seeing the signal.
As we will see more clearly later, what really matters for the main results of this paper
is that the government’s payoff, when it chooses action h (l), is higher if the citizen ex post
believes the state is more likely severe (mild). We believe this is a sensible feature of the
government payoff structure in the context of crisis management.
Notice also that the way we model political accountability differs from the conventional
approach. The standard approach assumes the government or policy-maker has some pri-
vate characteristics such as her preferences or competence. The citizen learns information
on her characteristics from her policy choice and if possible also from the consequence, and
then decides whether or not to reelect her.13 On the contrary, our model assumes that the
citizen assesses the policy per se. Certainly in many circumstances the citizen may care more
about some basic characteristics of the policy-maker such as her empathy for the public, and
her ability to gather relevant information and to implement policies, etc. In Appendix B,
we will report an alternative reputation model in this vein, and show that it delivers similar
results but somewhat different underlying economics.
2.1 Analysis
Given the citizen’s evaluation rule, the government trades off being blamed for underre-
acting against for overreacting. Heavy intervention is more able to generate a good outcome,
but this also means that it will more likely convince the citizen that the state is mild and the
adoption of costly heavy intervention is unnecessary. On the contrary, light intervention
will relieve the government from a criticism of overreaction, but it will more likely result
in a bad outcome and therefore cause an accusation of underreaction. The more optimistic
the citizen is initially, the more optimistic she will be after seeing a good outcome and so
the more likely she will favor light intervention. Therefore, intuitively the government has
a higher incentive to take the low action when the citizen’s prior µ0 is lower.
13This is the so-called forward-looking voting in the retrospective voting literature since the voter uses the
information learned from past behavior to select between the incumbent politician and future challengers. See,
e.g., the survey by Healy and Malhotra (2013). The other well-known strand in that literature, initiated by Key
(1966) and Barro (1973), is about backward-looking voting where the voter sanctions or rewards politicians
based on the outcome of their past behavior. Our modelling approach is closer to the latter in spirit.
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If the government takes action h, its expected payoff, given the true state is severe, is
qhITh(µ0)≥µ̂ + 1− qh . (3)
When the good outcome is realized, the high action is approved if and only if Th(µ0) ≥ µ̂;
when the bad outcome is realized, the high action is approved for sure since the true severe
state is perfectly revealed. If the government takes action l, its expected payoff is
qlITl(µ0)<µ̂ . (4)
When the good outcome is realized, the low action is approved if and only if Tl(µ0) < µ̂;
when the bad outcome is realized, the low action is disapproved for sure.
Let µ̂1 solve
Th(µ̂1) = µ̂ . (5)
It is the prior level from which the citizen’s belief will be updated downward to the cut-off
level µ̂ after seeing a high action and a good outcome. Similarly, let µ̃1 solve Tl(µ̃1) = µ̂.
Note that property (1) implies µ̂ ≤ µ̂1 < µ̃1.
Figure 1 plots expressions (3) and (4) and clearly shows the government’s trade-off.
When the high action is taken and a good outcome is realized (which occurs with proba-
bility qh), the action will be disapproved if Th(µ0) < µ̂, or equivalently if µ0 < µ̂1. In this
case, the government will be criticized for overreacting. In contrast, when the low action is
taken and a bad outcome is realized (which occurs with probability 1− ql), the government
will be faulted for underreacting. Therefore, when
qh > 1− ql , (6)
the risk of being accused of overreacting dominates, and so the government will take action
l if µ0 < µ̂1. If µ0 ≥ µ̂1, the government will take the first-best action h since the citizen is
too pessimistic about the state to disapprove the action even after seeing a good outcome.
Figure 1 describes this case under condition (6).14
It is also clear from Figure 1 that when the citizen has a sufficiently optimistic prior (µ0 <
µ̂1), either action will be disapproved with some probability. This formally captures the
aforementioned “damned-either-way” policy-making dilemma. This dilemma arises in our
model because each action is more likely to generate an outcome which induces the citizen
to believe the alternative action would be better. It does not rely on the randomness of the
14In the edge case with qh = 1 and ql = 0, the equality of (6) holds. There are many possible ways to break








Figure 1: The red thin line corresponds to the government’s payoff under action h (expression in (3)); while
the blue thick line corresponds to the payoff under action l (expression in (4)), where condition (6) holds and
Tl(µ̃1) = µ̂ and Th(µ̂1) = µ̂.
policy outcome. In fact the dilemma is the most prominent when the randomness vanishes,
i.e., when both qh = 1 and ql = 0.
When condition (6) fails, the government’s concern of being accused of underreacting
dominates, and so it will always take the high action which achieves the first-best outcome.
In the rest of the paper, we assume (6) and focus on the more interesting case depicted in
Figure 1 unless otherwise stated. Then we have the following result:
Proposition 1. The government takes action h if and only if µ0 ≥ µ̂1.
Therefore, in the single-society case the first-best outcome is achieved if and only if the
citizen is initially sufficiently pessimistic; otherwise, the government will pander to public
opinion and make a sub-optimal decision.15 Given Th(·) increases in qh and the definition of
µ̂ in expression (2), it is easy to see that µ̂1 decreases in qh and increases in ql and c. That is,
as expected a higher qh or a lower ql or c widens the range of µ0 in which the government
takes the first-best action.
Implication for pandemics. We apply the single-society model to the government’s op-
timal policy in a pandemic crisis. It helps to understand the source of political hurdles of
15A similar result holds when the government knows the state is mild. The government will then find it
optimal to take the unnecessary high action to comfort the citizen if and only if she is sufficiently paranoid
about the threat (i.e., if µ0 is sufficiently large).
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choosing strict measures.
Public mistrust. There has been a great consensus that the public’s trust in technocratic
expertise and professional elites is crucial in shaping a society’s response to a pandemic
crisis.16 A low public trust prevents the government from convincing people of the severity
of the crisis, resulting in a large divergence between the government’s and people’s belief
(as captured by 1− µ0 in our model) and so a suboptimal policy choice. Low public trust
may be caused by dysfunctional states and poor leadership, or it is simply a reflection of the
polarization of a society.
Cost of strict measures. The government’s hesitation to take an aggressive policy also
grows as its cost on the public increases. Recall that parameter c corresponds to the cost
difference between strict measures and light intervention relative to the citizen’s loss from
the bad crisis outcome. This relative cost is influenced by many economic and non-economic
factors. First, strict measures inevitably cause significant economic damages, threatening the
survival of a vast majority of people living paycheck to paycheck in societies with a low sav-
ing rate. In such a case the corresponding c should be large. By the same logic, a stimulus
payment or tax relief to the public helps to lower the cost of strict measures. Second, in a
society with a younger population or with more advanced critical care infrastructure, the
damage caused by a pandemic is smaller, making c larger. Third, if a society has a lower
tolerance of temporarily restricted civil liberties, it tends to have a larger c.
Doubts about strict measures. The government’s political cost of choosing strict measures
also depends on people’s perceived benefit of doing so (qh − ql). Characteristics such as
geographic isolation and low population density contribute to a large ql, while controversial
views on the effectiveness of strict measures (e.g. wearing face masks) may lead to a small
qh.17 These will increase the government’s incentive to take a light approach.
3 Multiple Societies
Now suppose that two identical societies i = 1, 2 face the threat of a common crisis sequen-
tially. (We will consider the case with more than two societies later.) As in the single-society
case, there are two players in each society: a government and a representative citizen. Each
government knows the crisis is severe, while the citizen in each society initially believes that
16See, for example, Francis Fukuyama, “The thing that determines a country’s resistance to the Coronavirus,”
The Atlantic, March 2020.
17See, e.g., https://nyti.ms/2YOMNiS on “More Americans should probably wear masks for protection” in
The New York Times.
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the crisis is severe with probability µ0 ∈ (0, 1). They agree to disagree as in the single-society
case. As before, each government has two possible actions ai ∈ {l, h} to choose from. The
outcome in each society, which is publicly observable, depends only on the state and the
government’s action in that society.
The timing is as follows: Government 1 moves first and chooses its action a1. The out-
come x1 in society 1 is then realized. After seeing a1 and x1, citizen 2 updates her belief of the
state and government 2 chooses its action a2. Then the outcome x2 in society 2 is realized.
Finally, citizens 1 and 2 evaluate their own government based on the information from both
societies.
Since a bad outcome in any society perfectly reveals the true state, we need only to spec-
ify the updated belief when the outcome is good in both societies. When a citizen sees a high
action and a good outcome in both societies, her posterior belief will be T[2]h (µ0), where T
[2]
h
denotes applying the operator Th twice. Similarly, her posterior will be T
[2]
l (µ0) after seeing
a low action and a good outcome in both societies, and Th ◦ Tl(µ0) after seeing a high action,
a low action and two good outcomes. Similar to (1), we have
T[2]l < Th ◦ Tl = Tl ◦ Th < T
[2]
h , (7)
and T[2]a ≤ Ta. As in the single-society model, government i’s action will be evaluated
according to citizen i’s posterior µ. Action h will be approved if µ ≥ µ̂, and otherwise
action l will be approved.
It is worth pointing out two implicit assumptions in this two-society model: First, we as-
sume a common prior for the public across the two societies.18 The case with heterogeneous
priors can be analyzed similarly, but does not add particularly new insights. Second, we
also assume that the crisis will arise in the second society regardless of the action and the
outcome in the first society. This is not crucial as long as a high action or a good outcome in
the first society does not completely halt the spread of the crisis.
3.1 Analysis
Let µ̂2 solve Th(µ̂2) = µ̂1, or equivalently
T[2]h (µ̂2) = µ̂ .
This is the prior level from which the citizen’s belief will be updated downward to the cut-
off level µ̂ after seeing a high action and a good outcome in both societies. Clearly we have
18With a common prior, our subsequent analysis remains unchanged if there is only a “common” citizen in
both societies, or a common principal facing two agents.
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that µ̂ ≤ µ̂1 ≤ µ̂2. A condition we will often refer to in the subsequent analysis is
ql(qh + ql) ≤ 1 . (8)
For any given qh, this condition holds if ql is sufficiently small.
The following result reports the equilibrium outcome of the two-society game:
Proposition 2. When there are two societies,
(i) if µ0 ≥ µ̂2, both governments take action h;
(ii) if µ0 < µ̂2, government 1 takes action h if and only if condition (8) holds, and government 2
takes action h if and only if a bad outcome is realized in the first society.
Proposition 2 identifies the condition under which government 1 is relieved from the
policy-making dilemma. When µ0 ≥ µ̂2 (which implies T[2]h (µ0) ≥ µ̂), citizens are suffi-
ciently pessimistic, and governments can safely choose the first-best action without being
blamed for overreacting.
The more interesting case is when µ0 < µ̂2. In this case, the presence of society 2 may
help government 1 by providing a counterfactual for citizen 1 to better see the consequence
of different policy options. More precisely, let us analyze the problem backward. First,
notice that a successful crisis management by government 1 always makes citizen 2 more
optimistic. With µ0 < µ̂2, we have Ta1(µ0) < µ̂1 for any action a1 ∈ {h, l}. From the analysis
in the single-society case, it is then immediate that government 2 will take action l if x1 = 0
and action h if x1 = 1, regardless of government 1’s action. Next, we consider government
1’s incentive. If government 1 takes action h, it will be approved if and only if the crisis
is out of control in at least one society, which happens with probability 1− qhql. Instead,
if government 1 takes action l, it will be approved if and only if both societies succeed in
containing the crisis, which occurs with probability q2l . Therefore, government 1 prefers
action h if and only if 1− qhql ≥ q2l , i.e., if condition (8) holds.
By comparing Propositions 1 and 2, it is easy to see that society 1 can either benefit or
suffer from the presence of the second society.
Corollary 1. Having the second society induces government 1 to switch from taking action l to
taking action h if µ0 < µ̂1 and (8) holds, and the reverse is true if µ̂1 ≤ µ0 < µ̂2 and (8) does














(b) Government 1’s choice: hypothetical situation.
Figure 2: The solid rectangle area describes the set of parameters where government 1 chooses action h
in the single-society model. The hatched area in (a) describes the set of parameters where government 1
chooses action h in the two-society model. The region (0, µ̂1) × [0, 1] corresponds to the positive sampling
effect, while the region [µ̂1, µ̂2) × [ql/qh, 2] corresponds to the negative sampling effect. The white-framed
region [µ̂1, µ̂2)× [ql/qh, 1] in (b) corresponds to the strategic effect.
This result is illustrated in Figure 2a. Three forces influence government 1’s decision:
First, independent of government 1’s action, the presence of society 2 increases the chance
that the true severe state is revealed. This encourages government 1 to take action h. We call
this a positive sampling effect. Second, independent of government 1’s action, the presence of
society 2 also generates the possibility that the good outcome is realized in both societies,
in which case citizens will become rather optimistic. This is called a negative sampling effect,
and it encourages government 1 to take action l instead. Finally, government 1’s action can
influence citizen 2’s interim belief and so government 2’s policy. In particular, when it takes
action h, it makes it more likely that citizen 2 becomes optimistic so that government 2 takes
action l, which increases the chance that the true state is revealed and government 1’s policy
is justified. We call this third effect a strategic effect.
To disentangle the strategic effect from the two sampling effects, we consider the follow-
ing hypothetical situation: suppose that citizen 2 cannot observe what has happened in soci-
ety 1, but citizen 1 can observe how the crisis unfolds in society 2. In this case, government
1’s policy choice is only affected by the sampling effects. Following a similar argument as in
the proof of Proposition 2, one can readily show that government 1’s action can be different
when µ̂1 ≤ µ0 < µ̂2, in which case it will take action h if and only if
qh(qh + ql) ≤ 1 , (9)
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which is equivalent to ql(qh + ql) ≤ ql/qh. This is a more stringent condition than (8). The
gap between these two conditions, as illustrated as the white-framed region in Figure 2b,
captures the strategic effect. Intuitively, when µ̂1 ≤ µ0 < µ̂2, if citizen 2 does not observe
what has happened in society 1, her pessimistic prior induces government 2 to take action
h. While in our model, after seeing x1 = 0 citizen 2 will become sufficiently optimistic
(Th(µ0) < µ̂1) so that government 2 will take action l instead, which increases the chance
that the true state is revealed.
Next, we compare all parties’ (ex ante) welfare between the two societies to see whether
there is a first-mover advantage in our model. The citizen’s welfare is measured according
to the true state.
Corollary 2. If µ0 ≥ µ̂2, both the citizen and the government are equally well across societies.
If µ0 < µ̂2 and (8) holds, citizen 1 does better than citizen 2, and government 1 does better than
government 2 if and only if 2ql ≤ 1. If µ0 < µ̂2 and (8) does not hold, both the citizen and the
government in society 2 do better than in society 1.
The first society can influence the second society’s belief and action in favor of its own
welfare. But the second society has more information when it is its turn to make the decision.
This, however, is not always a blessing, given the citizen’s welfare is measured according to
the true state instead of her own belief. When a good outcome is realized in the first society,
it will mislead citizen 2 to be over-optimistic. Of course, when a bad outcome is realized
in the first society, it helps the second society. The above result suggests that if the citizen
is initially sufficient optimistic (µ0 < µ̂2) and the low action has a sufficiently small chance
in containing the crisis (ql sufficiently small), the first society has the first-mover advantage.
(Recall that a smaller ql amplifies the strategic effect as action l by government 2 will reveal
the true state more likely.)
Implication for pandemics. The two-society model also has some useful implications
for the pandemic crisis.
Misleading success. A key force in our model is that a successful crisis control in the first
society will give people in the second society a false sense of safety. This confidence inflation
is greater if, all else equal, the first society is perceived as less developed in health infrastruc-
ture (corresponding to smaller qa1). In this case the political hurdle to strict measures in the
second society will be larger.
Information manipulation. We assume free information flow across countries, but it is
straightforward to see that governments have incentives to influence the information flow.
Government 1, if it has succeeded in containing the crisis, can benefit from downplaying the
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threat by broadcasting its success to inflate people’s doubts in society 2 about the severity of
the crisis. Meanwhile, it also has an incentive to broadcast the failure of society 2’s light in-
tervention to its own people to justify its strict policy. Government 2, on the other hand, has
an incentive to downplay or sow doubt about society 1’s success to minimize the confidence
inflation among its own people and therefore the political hurdle to strict measures.
Commitment to strict measures. The first mover takes advantage from the aforementioned
strategic effect by pushing up the political hurdle faced by government 2. To counter this
force, government 2 could make a preemptive commitment to strict measures. As shown
in Figure 2b, such a commitment will turn the tables in some circumstances: it can induce
government 1 to take the low action and so help justify government 2’s aggressive policy.
3.2 More societies
It is not difficult to extend our analysis to the case with n societies. The main insights
remain, but the general case also yields some new insights such as the societies in the middle
of the sequence may perform the worst. We first report the equilibrium in this general case.
Proposition 3. Let µ̂n solve T
[n]
h (µ̂n) = µ̂. When there are n societies,
(i) if µ0 ≥ µ̂n, all the governments take action h;
(ii) if µ0 < µ̂n, for any i = 1, 2, ..., n, (a) if xj = 1 in at least one predecessor society j < i,
government i takes action h; (b) if xj = 0 for all j < i or if i = 1, government i takes action h
if and only if qn−il (qh + ql) ≤ 1.
A few simple observations follow. First, since µ̂n increases in n, result (i) implies that
it becomes harder for all the governments to take action h when there are more societies.
Second, when µ0 < µ̂n, having more societies increases the ith government’s incentive to
take action h more likely if the true state has not been revealed. This is because, when there
are more societies, both the positive sampling effect (i.e., the true state is revealed in some
subsequent society) and the strategic effect become stronger, while the negative sampling
effect (i.e., the good outcome is realized in all the subsequent societies) becomes weaker.
Similarly, when µ0 < µ̂n and the history is good so far, earlier governments are more likely
to take action h.
To illustrate the point that the society in the middle of the sequence may perform the
worst, consider an example with three societies and suppose µ0 < µ̂3 and q2l (qh + ql) ≤ 1 <
ql(qh + ql). From the proposition above, it is easy to see that government 1 will take action
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h, which is the best for its citizen. If x1 = 1, then the true state is revealed and so the other
two governments will take action h as well, in which case the three societies are equally
well. If x1 = 0, government 2 will take action l for sure, which is the worst for its citizen,
while government 3 will take action h with some chance (i.e., when x2 = 1), which puts its
citizen in the middle of the ranking. Intuitively, the first society enjoys the greatest positive
sampling effect and the strategic effect, while the third society has the most information and
its government will take the first-best policy if the true state has been revealed.
4 Extension: Asymmetric state information and signaling
This section discusses an extension where the citizen believes that the government pos-
sesses superior information concerning the state. As a result, the citizen will attempt to infer
the state from the government action as well, based on her rational expectation of the gov-
ernment’s policy strategy. This signaling channel was intentionally shut down in our main
model. Here we demonstrate that having this signaling channel does not change the main
insights except in the polar case when the government perfectly knows the true state.
Let us first consider the single-society case. Let ω denote the state, and it can be bad/severe
(B) or good/mild (G). The citizen’s prior is Pr(ω = B) = µ0, and the government’s prior is
Pr(ω = B) = ν0. When µ0 = ν0, we have the common-prior case, but as we will see these
two priors play completely separate roles, and so here we present the more general case.
Before choosing its policy the government observes a private signal s ∈ {b, g} of the state,
and it is commonly known that the signal structure is Pr(b|B) = Pr(g|G) = δ ∈ [12 , 1].It is
assumed that the government is unable to convey its private information directly to the cit-
izen (e.g., because the state information is too complex to communicate). The other aspects
of the model remain unchanged, and we focus on the interior case with 0 < ql < qh < 1. The
major difference now is that the citizen can also infer some information on the state from the
government’s action alone based on her equilibrium belief of the government’s strategy. The
government strategy is denoted by σ≡(σb, σg), where σs is the probability the government




ν0 Pr(s|B) + (1− ν0)Pr(s|G)
be the government’s updated belief of the state after receiving signal s. This is what matters
for its policy decision. The interesting case is when νg < µ̂ < νb, i.e., when the efficient
policy, from the government’s point of view, is h (l) after seeing a bad (good) signal. This
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requires δ to be sufficiently high.
For the citizen, what matters for her evaluation of the government policy is her posterior
after seeing both the action and the outcome. If the outcome is bad (x = 1), it perfectly
reveals state B. If the outcome is good (x = 0), let Tσa (µ0) denote the citizen’s posterior when
the government takes action a and it is believed to be using strategy σ. Specifically,
Tσh (µ0) =
µ0σBqh





















where σB ≡ δσb + (1− δ)σg and σG ≡ (1− δ)σb + δσg are respectively the expected proba-
bility that the government takes action h under strategy (σb, σg) when the true state is B or
G. (We stipulate 1/0 = ∞.) Both posteriors are increasing in µ0 as in the baseline model, but
now they also depend on the government’s policy strategy σ. Let µ̂σa solve Tσa (µ) = µ̂ when-
ever this is well defined, i.e., it is the prior from which the citizen’s belief will be updated to
the threshold level µ̂ after seeing action a and a good outcome. (Note that µ̂1 and µ̃1 in the
baseline model are respectively equal to µ̂1,1h and µ̂
0,0
l .)
For a given signal s, the government’s decision is similar as in the baseline model: its
expected payoff is
πs,h ≡ ps,hITσh (µ0)≥µ̂ + 1− ps,h
if it takes action h, and is
πs,l ≡ ps,lITσl (µ0)<µ̂
if it takes action l, where ps,a ≡ νsqa + 1− νs is the government’s expected probability, after
receiving signal s, that a good outcome will be realized under action a. The government’s
optimal strategy is then determined by comparing πs,h and πs,l, and in equilibrium it should
be consistent with σ.
We maintain the assumption qh + ql > 1 as in the baseline model. Then it is ready to
check that we must have ps,h + ps,l > 1, and so the payoffs πs,a, as functions of µ0, are
similar to those in Figure 1 (with ql replaced by ps,l and 1 − qh replaced by 1 − ps,h). In
particular, for any µ0 it is impossible that πs,h = πs,l given our payoff specification. This
implies that in our model the government will never play a mixed strategy.
In the polar case with δ = 1 (i.e., when the government’s signal perfectly reveals the true
state), it is easy to see that there is a separating equilibrium with σb = 1 and σg = 0 (i.e., the
government takes action h (l) for sure upon seeing a bad (good) signal). In this equilibrium,
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the citizen perfectly infers the state from the government’s action (and the outcome infor-
mation becomes redundant), and the government action is always proved. Notice, however,
this equilibrium is not “strict” in the sense that given the citizen’s belief the government is
actually indifferent between the two actions. 19
Once we go beyond this polar case, however, the separating equilibrium with σb = 1 and
σg = 0 can no longer be sustained. The intuition is easy to see when δ < 1 is sufficiently
close to 1. Suppose that the citizen holds the belief that the government is playing the sep-
arating strategy. If the government takes action h, its expected payoff is 1 regardless of the
signal it receives, since the citizen will infer the state is B very likely and so will approve
the action even if a good outcome is realized. If the government takes action l, however, its
expected payoff must be strictly below 1. This is because no matter what signal it receives,
the government is never perfectly sure that the state is G given δ < 1 and so there is always
a chance that the state is B and a bad outcome arises, in which case its low action will be
disapproved. In other words, action h is always a safer option for the government. This
contradicts the separating strategy.
More formally, when δ < 1, in the appendix we prove the following results for any
given µ0: there are no separating equilibria with σs = 1 and σs′ = 0; any equilibrium must be a
pure-strategy pooling equilibrium. In particular, there is a pooling equilibrium with proper off-
equilibrium beliefs in which regardless of its private signal, the government always takes
action h (i.e., σb = σg = 1) if µ0 ≥ µ̂1 and action l (i.e., σb = σg = 0) if µ0 < µ̂1, where µ̂1 =
µ̂1,1h takes the same value as (5) in the baseline model. In this equilibrium, the government’s
policy choice alone does not convey any information on the state, and so the outcome is the
same as in our baseline model and features a similar policy-making dilemma.
Now consider the two-society case where the state is common but each government
receives an independent signal of the state with precision δ < 1. We show that having
the second society can enable the first government to take the efficient separating strat-
egy σb = 1 and σg = 0. The single-society argument implies that there is only a pooling
equilibrium in the second society, and suppose it takes the form specified above. Then
as we show in the appendix, the desired outcome arises when T1,1h ◦ T
1,0
h (µ0) < µ̂ and
pb,l(pb,h + pb,l) < 1 < pg,l(pg,h + pg,l). These conditions are qualitatively similar to those
in Proposition 2 in the baseline model. The first condition, which holds if µ0 is sufficiently
low, ensures that after seeing a high action and a good outcome in society 1, people in society
19Another subtlety is that on the off-equilibrium path when the government deviates to action l at state B,
if a bad outcome is realized, the action and the outcome generate completely opposite inferences so that the
citizen’s Bayesian updating is not well defined.
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2 will be optimistic enough so that their government will take action l. The second condition
holds when ql is sufficiently low, and νb (νg) is sufficiently high (low), which is the case if δ
is sufficiently high. It ensures that government 1 will take the efficient strategy, anticipating
a good outcome will induce a low action in society 2. Intuitively, when government 1 is
sufficiently confident that the state is bad (i.e., νb is high), it believes that an induced low
action in society 2 will tend to generate a bad outcome, which will help justify its choice of
high action; in contrast, when government 1 is sufficiently confident that the state is good
(i.e., νg is low), it believes that even a low action will tend to generate a good outcome, and
together with the same likely outcome in society 2 this will justify its choice of low action.
Discussion. This extended model with signaling is related to Brandenburger and Polak
(1996) (BP thereafter). They study how a firm may make decisions the market wants to see.
In their model, the firm receives a private signal of the state and then takes an action (e.g., an
investment decision) which generates a profit if it matches the state. After seeing the firm’s
action (but not the resulting outcome), the market updates its belief on the state and then
assesses the firm. The market assessment determines the firm’s share price which the firm
aims to maximize. BP show that if the prior is skewed to one state, there is no equilibrium in
which the firm plays a separating strategy and maximizes its own expected profit. Instead
in any equilibrium the firm’s decision panders to the market’s prior to some extent. This
remains true even in the case with multiple firms which observe independent signals and
make sequential decisions and are all evaluated by the market in the end.
Our model shares some features with BP: the market (the public) assesses a firm (a gov-
ernment) based on its posterior of the state instead of some underlying fundamental (e.g.,
the manager/government’s ability), and the actions taken by early firms (governments) in-
fluence later firms’ (governments’) information and decisions. Nevertheless, the two papers
differ in several important aspects. First, in BP both states and actions are symmetric (i.e.,
they can be relabelled), while in our model they are asymmetric. This asymmetry is natural
in our context of crisis prevention (e.g., regardless of the state the high action prevents a
crisis more likely than the low action). Second, in BP the market does not observe the out-
come of the action and it only infers the state from the firm’s action, while the observable
outcome plays an important role in our model. Third, the above two differences imply that
the policy-making dilemma in our single-society model does not occur in BP, and the result
that having another society can restore the first government’s incentive to take the efficient
action does not arise in BP either.
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5 Conclusion
This paper provides a framework for studying crisis management with multiple jurisdic-
tions or societies. We first highlight a “damned-either-way” policy-making dilemma: suffi-
cient precautions can contain a crisis, but people may then become skeptical of the severity
of the problem and question the costly response; light intervention is less costly but often
fails to control the crisis, and people will then accuse the policymaker of underreacting. Such
a dilemma can raise the political cost for the government to take an efficient policy. We then
argue that the dilemma will be mitigated if people can see the counterfactual policy out-
come. One possibility is when another society faces the same crisis afterward. The success
under an aggressive policy in the first society boosts the optimism of people in the second
society, increasing the chance for the second society to adopt a light approach and experi-
ence an outbreak, which in turn justifies the first society’s policy choice. This helps explain,
for example, why similar societies might respond to a common crisis differently, and why
societies that handle the crisis later may perform worse despite having more information.
This paper has focused on “preventive” policies that if succeed cause the public to ques-
tion the severity of a potential crisis. In the pandemic example, they are policies such as wide
testing and tracking, mandatory quarantine, travel bans and even strict lock-downs from the
early stage. Another type of policies which we do not study in this paper are “mitigating”
policies that aim to reduce the damage of a crisis when it already outbreaks and its severity
is already known. In the pandemic example, they are policies such as stockpiling ventilators,
subsidizing medicine and vaccine research, and stimulus payment. When the government is
constrained by the policy-making dilemma from implementing preventive policies, it may
then reply more on mitigating measures.20 The counterfactual effect predicts that early-hit
countries tend to focus more on preventive measures while later countries on mitigating
measures.
Another interesting perspective is to consider countries with different cultures, institu-
tions, or public infrastructures, etc. Depending on which countries are hit first by a crisis, the
dynamics of crisis management may vary significantly, resulting in rather different welfare
outcomes.
20Fox and Van Weelden (2015) study a model of crisis prevention when a policy maker can allocate effort
across multiple tasks, but the essential economic force there is different from ours.
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A Appendix: omitted proofs and details
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Suppose µ0 ≥ µ̂2. If government 1 takes action h and the outcome
is x1 = 1, both citizens learn the true state, in which case government 1’s action will be
approved and government 2 will take action h as well. If government 1 takes action h and
the outcome is x1 = 0, then citizen 2’s interim belief will be Th(µ0) ≥ µ̂1, in which case
government 2 will take action h as well. The two citizens’ posterior will then be at least
T[2]h (µ0) ≥ µ̂, and so both governments’ actions will be approved. Therefore, if government
1 takes action h, it will always get approved and have an expected payoff 1.
Conversely, if government 1 takes action l, with probability 1− ql the true severe state
will be revealed, in which case its action will be disapproved, and so its payoff is at most
ql < 1. Therefore, government 1’s optimal choice is action h. The above argument then
implies that government 2 will take action h as well.
(ii) Suppose now µ0 < µ̂2. If government 1 takes action l, it will be approved if and only
if x1 = x2 = 0. When x1 = 0, citizen 2’s interim belief will be updated to Tl(µ0) < µ̂1, and
so government 2 will take action l. Therefore, x1 = x2 = 0 occurs with probability q2l , and
this is government 1’s expected payoff.
If government 1 takes action h, with probability 1− qh, x1 = 1, in which case government
1’s payoff is 1. With probability qh, x1 = 0, in which case citizen 2’s interim belief will be
Th(µ0) < µ̂1, and so government 2 will take action l. For government 1’ action h to be
approved, we need x2 = 1, which happens with probability 1− ql. (Otherwise, the citizen’s
posterior would be Th ◦Tl(µ0) < µ̂ and she would not approve action h.) Hence, government
1’s expected payoff is (1− qh) + qh(1− ql) = 1− qhql.
Therefore, government 1’s optimal choice is action h if and only if q2l ≤ 1− qhql, which is
equivalent to (8).
Proof of Corollary 2. When µ0 ≥ µ̂2, both governments take the same action h, and so all
parties’ expected payoff must be the same across societies.
When µ0 < µ̂2 and (8) holds, government 1 takes action h while government 2 takes
action h if and only if x1 = 1. So citizen 1 must do better given the high action is the first-
best action. As we have shown in the proof of Proposition 2, in this case government 1’s
payoff is 1− qhql. Government 2’s payoff is 1− qh + qhql. (When x1 = 1, government 2 will
take action h, in which its payoff is 1. When x1 = 0, government 2 will take action l, in which
case its action will be approved if and only if x2 = 0.) Comparing these two payoffs yields
the condition stated in the result.
When µ0 < µ̂2 and (8) does not hold, government 1 takes action l while government 2
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takes h if x1 = 1. So the citizen in society 2 must do better. As we have shown in the proof
of Proposition 2, in this case government 1’s payoff is q2l . Government 2’s payoff is at least
q2l because when x1 = 0 government 2 will take action l, and this will be approved by the
citizen if x2 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Let us use induction and suppose the claim is true when there are
n− 1 societies. If a1 = h, then all the citizens in the subsequent societies will update their
interim beliefs to µ = 1 (if x1 = 1) or µ = T
[1]
h (µ0) ≥ µ̂n−1 (if x1 = 0). In either case,
according to the induction assumption, all the subsequent governments will take action h.
When x1 = 1, government 1 gets 1; when x1 = 0, it gets 1 as well because even if xj = 0 for
all j > 1 the posterior will be T[n]h (µ0) ≥ µ̂. Hence, government 1’s expected payoff, when it
takes the high action, is 1. If a1 = l, government 1 gets zero if x1 = 1, and so its payoff is at
most ql. Therefore, government 1 should take action h.
(ii) Part (a) is obvious given a bad outcome in any society reveals the true severe state.
Again we use induction and suppose (b) is true when there are n − 1 societies. Consider
government 1’s decision when there are n societies. There are n− 1 cases. We call the case of
ql(qh + ql) ≤ 1 “case 1,” the case of qkl (qh + ql) ≤ 1 < q
k−1
l (qh + ql) “case k” if 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 2,
and the case of qn−2l (qh + ql) > 1 “case n− 1.”
If government 1 takes action h, it will be approved if and only if the true severe state is
revealed at some point. With probability 1− qh, x1 = 1, in which case government 1 gets
1. With probability qh, x1 = 0, in which case the citizens in the subsequent societies have
an interim belief T[1]h (µ0) < µ̂n−1 and so the induction assumption can be applied. Then
government 1’s payoff depends on how many subsequent governments will take action h
and how many will take action l. In case 1, all the subsequent governments but the last one
will take action h if the history is good so far. So among them the chance that the true state is
revealed is 1− qn−2h ql. Then government 1’s payoff is 1− qh + qh(1− q
n−2
h ql) = 1− q
n−1
h ql.
In case k, all the subsequent governments but the last k will take action h if the history is
good so far. Then government 1’s payoff is 1 − qn−kh q
k
l . In case n − 1, all the subsequent
government will take action l if the history is good so far. Then government 1’s payoff is
1− qhqn−1l .
If government 1 takes action l instead, it will be approved if and only if the true state
is never revealed. With probability 1− ql, x1 = 1, in which case its payoff is zero. With
probability ql, x1 = 0, in which case the citizens in the subsequent societies have an interim
belief T[1]l (µ0) < µ̂n−1 and so the induction assumption can be applied. The analysis is then
similar as above. In case 1, all the subsequent governments but the last one will take action h
if the history is good so far, and so the chance that xi = 0 among all the subsequent societies
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l . In case k, all the subsequent governments
but the last k will take action h if the history is good so far, and so government 1’s payoff is
qn−k−1h q
k+1
l . In case n− 1, all the subsequent government will take action l if the history is
good so far, and so government 1’s payoff is qnl .
It is then straightforward to verify: in case 1, government 1 prefers action h if and only
if qn−2h ql(qh + ql) ≤ 1, which is implied by the condition of case 1; in case k, government 1
prefers action h if and only if qn−k−1h q
k
l (qh + ql) ≤ τ, which is also implied by the condition
of case k; in case n− 1, government 1 prefers action h if and only if qn−1l (qh + ql) ≤ 1, which
implies the condition of case n− 1. Therefore, we can conclude that government 1 will take
action h if and only if qn−1l (qh + ql) ≤ 1. This completes the proof.
Omitted details in Section 4. In the single-society case, we show that if δ < 1 there is no
equilibrium with σb = 1 and σg = 0. (The other counter-intuitive case with σb = 0 and
σg = 1 is easy to rule out.) If the citizen believes that the government is playing the above
















When δ < 1, both are well-behaved strictly increasing functions. It is also clear that given








and so T1,0h (µ0) > T
1,0
l (µ0). This implies
µ̂1,0h < µ̂
1,0
l . From a graph similar to Figure 1, it is ready to see that regardless of signal s,
we have πs,h > πs,l if µ0 ≥ µ̂1,0h and πs,h < πs,l otherwise. Therefore, for a given µ0, the
separating strategy cannot be sustained in equilibrium. Essentially, this is because given
ps,h + ps,l > 1, the ranking of πs,h and πs,l is independent of the signal s.
We have explained in the main text that there is no mixed-strategy equilibrium. Hence,
only pure-strategy pooling equilibria remain possible. Suppose first the citizen believes that








Let us specify the off-equilibrium belief so that T1,1l (µ0) < T
1,1
h (µ0). (This is reasonable
since without the signaling channel a low action with a good outcome is more convincing
evidence that the state is good.) Then we have µ̂1,1h < µ̂
1,1
l , and so the government will
indeed always take action h if µ0 ≥ µ̂1,1h . Now consider the case when the citizen believes
that the government’s policy strategy is σb = σg = 0 (i.e., it always takes action l regardless
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A reasonable off-equilibrium belief is T0,0h (µ0) > T
0,0





and so the government will indeed always take action l if µ0 < µ̂
0,0
h . If we assume T
0,0
h (µ0)
takes the same form as (10) (which can be justified if both σb and σg converge to 0 at the same
speed), then µ̂0,0h = µ̂
1,1
h . This is the pooling equilibrium described in the main text.
In the two-society case, let us consider the possibility of the equilibrium where govern-
ment 1 adopts the efficient separating strategy σb = 1 and σg = 0. When the citizen in either
society believes that government 1 is taking this strategy, her belief of the state, after seeing
action a and a good outcome, is updated to T1,0a (µ0). From the definition of µ̂
1,1
h , we can see
that T1,0a (µ0) < µ̂
1,1




a (µ0) < µ̂. This is true for both a = h and a = l if
T1,1h ◦ T
1,0
h (µ0) < µ̂ . (12)
Under this condition, following a similar argument as in the baseline model, we can see that
when government 1 takes action h after seeing signal s, its expected payoff is
πs,h = 1− ps,h ps,l
(
1− IT0,0l ◦T1,0h (µ0)≥µ̂
)
;
when it takes action l after seeing signal s, its expected payoff is



















µ̂. Therefore, πb,h > πb,l if pb,l(pb,h + pb,l) < 1, and πg,h < πg,l if pg,l(pg,h + pg,l) > 1.
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B Appendix: other extensions and discussions
In this appendix, we report two other extensions: one with a more general government
payoff structure, and the other with a more general information structure; and we also ex-
plore an alternative “reputation” model.
B.1 More general government payoff
In the baseline model, we assume a simple payoff structure for the government: it gets 1
if its action is approved and 0 otherwise. We now consider a more general payoff structure
as in the table below:
x = 0 x = 1
a approved 1 β ∈ [0, 1]
a disapproved
αo if a = h and Th(µ0) < µ̂
α+u if a = l and Tl(µ0) ≥ µ̂
α−u ≡ 0
In the first cell, the action is approved and the outcome is good, in which case the govern-
ment gets the highest possible payoff 1. In the second cell, the action is approved but the
outcome is bad, which can happen only if a = h. In this case the citizen may doubt the
government’s enforcement ability, and we assume the government’s payoff is β ∈ [0, 1]. In
the third cell, the action leads to a good outcome but it is disapproved. If the action is h,
the government must be criticized for overreacting, in which case its payoff is αo < 1; if the
action is l, the government must be criticized (perhaps mildly) for underreacting, in which
case its payoff is α+u < 1. In the last cell, the action is disapproved and the outcome is bad,
which can happen only if a = l. In this case the government should suffer from a more
severe criticism for underreacting, and let its payoff be α−u ≤ α+u and we normalize it to 0. In
sum, we assume the parameters satisfy 0 = α−u ≤ α+u , β ≤ 1 and αo < 1. In particular, αo < 0
is allowed to reflect the possibility that the citizen strongly dislikes overreaction. Note that
our baseline model corresponds to the case with β = 1 and the three α parameters being 0.
The single-society case can be analyzed similarly as before. The government’s expected
payoff, if it takes action h, is qh(ITh(µ0)≥µ̂ + αoITh(µ0)<µ̂) + (1 − qh)β, and otherwise it is
ql(ITl(µ0)<µ̂ + α
+
u ITh(µ0)≥µ̂). By a similar argument as in the baseline case, one can check
that Proposition 1 (i.e., the government takes action h if and only if µ0 ≥ µ̂1) still holds if we
replace condition (6) by
ql > qhαo + (1− qh)β .
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This is easier to be satisfied when αo, the payoff associated with overreaction, is smaller. (If
αo < 0, this condition is even satisfied in the polar case with ql = 0 and qh = 1.) Given
the cut-off rule in the single-society case, the main economic force in the two-society model
remains unchanged as well. For example, when the three α parameters are zero, Proposition
2 still holds if we replace condition (8) by ql(qh + ql) ≤ β + (1− β)qh.
The government’s payoff can be generalized in other aspects as well. For instance, the
citizen’s prior may also directly affect her evaluation of the government’s policy, and the
so-called “outcome bias” (i.e., a good outcome will be praised while a bad outcome will
be criticized regardless of the action) may also play some role. Also, the government may
directly care about the citizen’s welfare to some extent. However, provided that the evalua-
tion component based on the citizen’s posterior is sufficiently important, our main insights
should carry over.21
B.2 Beyond bad-news information structure
In the baseline model we assume that when the state is mild, the outcome is always good
regardless of the government action. Now we relax this assumption and let the outcome
under the mild state be stochastic as well. More specifically, suppose x = 0 with probability
q′a for a ∈ {l, h} under the mild state. It is natural to assume q′a > qa and
qh − ql > q′h − q′l . (13)
The latter implies the “marginal” effect of taking the high action in containing the crisis is
higher when the state is severe.
As in the baseline model, let µ̂ be the threshold in the citizen’s evaluation rule. It now
solves
c = µ(qh − ql) + (1− µ)(q′h − q′l) (14)
since the high action can also lower the chance of a bad outcome under the mild state. Under
condition (13) the citizen will approve action h if and only if her posterior is greater than µ̂.
21Generally, we can define ṽa(x, µ, µ0) as the government’s payoff when it takes action a, the realized out-
come is x, the citizen’s posterior is µ, and the citizen’s prior is µ0. Since µ is function of (a, x, µ0), we can
rewrite the payoff function as va(x, µ0). Let v̄a(µ0) ≡ qhva(0, µ0) + (1− qh)va(1, µ0) be the expected payoff
function associated with action a. Then we have the cut-off result if v̄h(µ0) increases in µ0, v̄l(µ0) decreases
in µ0, v̄h(0) < v̄l(0), and v̄h(1) > v̄l(1). At this level of generality, of course it can be complex to specify the
primitive conditions for all these conditions to be satisfied.
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Let Ta,x(µ0) be the citizen’s posterior of the state after seeing action a and outcome x.
When a good outcome is realized, we have
Th,0(µ0) =
µ0qh
µ0qh + (1− µ0)q′h
; Tl,0(µ0) =
µ0ql
µ0ql + (1− µ0)q′l
.
Both are less than µ0 since observing a good outcome makes the citizen more optimistic. The
opposite is true when a bad outcome is realized, in which case we have
Th,1(µ0) =
µ0(1− qh)
µ0(1− qh) + (1− µ0)(1− q′h)
; Tl,1(µ0) =
µ0(1− ql)
µ0(1− ql) + (1− µ0)(1− q′l)
.
Notice that condition (13) implies q′h/q
′
l < qh/ql and so Tl,0(µ0) < Th,0(µ0).
22 Let µ̂a,x solve
Ta,x(µ̂a,x) = µ̂. Then we have
µ̂h,1, µ̂l,1 < µ̂ < µ̂h,0 < µ̂l,0 .
Notice that µ̂h,0 and µ̂l,0 are the counterparts of µ̂1 and µ̃1 in the baseline model.
Given the government knows the true state is severe, its expected payoff if it takes action
h is
qhITh,0(µ0)≥µ̂ + (1− qh)ITh,1(µ0)≥µ̂ ,
and its expected payoff if it takes action l is
qlITl,0(µ0)<µ̂ + (1− ql)ITl,1(µ0)<µ̂ .
The main difference, compared to the baseline case, is that now action l can also be approved
when the outcome is bad, which occurs when the citizen was initially very optimistic. As a
result, no action will dominate the other over all possible priors µ0 as illustrated in Figure
3. (In the baseline model with q′h = q
′
l = 1, both µ̂h,1 and µ̂l,1 degenerate at 0. In that case
action h dominates in Figure 3b.)
If ql > 1− qh as in the baseline case, the government takes action h if and only if µ0 ≥ µ̂h,0
as illustrated in Figure 3a; in contrast, if ql < 1− qh, the government takes action h if and
only if µ0 ≥ max{µ̂h,1, µ̂l,1} as illustrated on Figure 3b. In the former case, overreaction arises
under action h more likely than underreaction under action l, so the government takes h less
likely than the citizen herself would do according to her prior; in the latter case, however, the
opposite is true, so that the government takes h more likely than the citizen herself would do.
It is also clear that when the citizen’s prior is rather extreme, the government will take the
22But condition (13) does not necessarily imply (1− q′h)/(1− q
′
l) < (1− qh)/(1− ql), and so the ranking















(b) 1− qh > ql
Figure 3: Government’s payoff under general information structure: the red thin line corre-
sponds to the government’s payoff under action h, while the blue thick line corresponds to
the payoff under action l.
action consistent with her prior, in which case it always gets approved. The policy-making
dilemma now arises when µ0 is in the middle range.
Since the single-society case still features a cut-off rule as in the baseline model, the main
economic force in the two-society case remains unchanged as well. However, with more
societies it is possible for a belief-and-action cycle to arise, which differs from the baseline
case. For example, consider the case when a low action in an early society leads to a bad
outcome. Since the bad outcome is no longer conclusive about the state, if it leads to a high
action and a good outcome in the next society, societies afterward can become optimistic
enough to adopt a low action again.
B.3 A reputation model
As we discussed in the main text, a more conventional approach to model political ac-
countability is to introduce a government’s private type that is payoff relevant to citizens. In
this section, we explore a modelling approach in this vein which can generate similar main
results but with somewhat different economics and empirical implications.
There are two societies, where each government can be either competent or incompetent.
The competence type is independent across the two governments. A competent government
is a strategic player who chooses an action a ∈ {l, h} to maximize its payoff as specified
below given its information on the state, while an incompetent government is a “behavioral”
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player who mechanically commits to action h. This behavioral-type approach is standard in
the reputation literature. See Kreps and Wilson (1982) for classic examples and Mailath
and Samuelson (2015) for a comprehensive survey. In our crisis management context, the
assumption for the behavioral type can be justified if an incompetent government is unable
to efficiently acquire the state information and its enforcement ability is extremely poor. If
it takes the low action, a third catastrophic outcome will take place when the state is severe,
causing massive damage to both the society and itself. Consequently, provided it believes
there is a chance that the true state is severe, an incompetent government always takes the
high action.
Each government privately observes its competence type, and if it is competent it also
observes a private signal of the true state. For simplicity we assume the signal perfectly
reveals the true state, but no government can creditably reveal its information to its citizen.
Each citizen’s prior is that a government is competent with probability λ0 and the state is
severe with probability µ0, and they know that their government, if competent, observes a
perfect signal.23
The other aspects of the model remain the same as before, except for each government’s
payoff structure. Let λ denote a citizen’s posterior belief that her government is competent,
i.e., the government’s reputation. Her government’s payoff is then
λ + γu(a, x)
for some constant γ > 0, where u(a, x) is the citizen’s payoff defined in (2) when her gov-
ernment’s action is a and the outcome is x.24 As standard in the political economy literature,
the reputation concern can be justified by introducing a post-crisis reelection in each society:
the citizen prefers a competent government and chooses between the incumbent govern-
ment and a challenger whose reputation is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. This specification
implies that each government is motivated by both its citizen’s welfare and the perks of
office.
The strategy of a government specifies a competent government’s policy choice in each
state, conditional on the action and the outcome in the previous society (if any). Citizens
observe actions and outcomes in both societies and form their beliefs about the state and the
types of governments. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium consists of governments’ strategies
23The feature that the citizen is uncertain about both an underlying state and the policy maker’s type is
similar to, for example, Coate and Morris (1995) and Maskin and Tirole (2004).
24Notice that if γ = 0 and each government only cares about its reputation, then action l becomes their
dominant strategy as it perfectly signals competence.
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and citizens’ beliefs that satisfy the following properties. First, citizens’ beliefs are consis-
tent with governments’ strategies in the sense that they are generated by Bayesian updating
wherever possible. Second, each government’s strategy is optimal given citizens’ beliefs.
Let us first consider the single-society case. When the state is mild, a competent govern-
ment will choose action l. This is because the low action is a perfect signal of competence,
and it is also the best policy for the citizen given the outcome is always good under a mild
state. What needs to be pinned down is a competent government’s strategy when the state is
severe. Let σ ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that it chooses action h. The government’s trade-off
is between its desire to separate itself from an incompetent type (which favors action l) and
the citizen’s welfare (which favors action h).
Let λσa,x denote the citizen’s posterior of the government’s type after seeing action a and
outcome x given the competent government’s policy strategy σ when the state is severe.
When a = l, the posterior λσl,x is always 1. When a = h and x = 1, the citizen learns that the
state must be severe, and so
λσh,1 =
λ0σ(1− qh)







when a = h and x = 0, we have
λσh,0 =
λ0µ0σqh











(We stipulate 1/0 = ∞ so that σ = 0 is permitted.) Note that the government will take action
h only if it is competent and the state is severe or if it is incompetent.
The following two observations are important for both our subsequent analysis and the
key insights in this reputation model: First, we have λσh,0 ≤ λ
σ
h,1 ≤ λ0. Given an incompetent
government always takes the high action, h is a signal of incompetence, and that is why both
posteriors become smaller than λ0. Meanwhile, when x = 1, the citizen learns the state is
severe, in which case h is less a signal of incompetence given the competent government is
more likely to take h in the severe state than in the mild state. Second, both posteriors are
increasing in λ0, µ0 and σ. In particular, when the citizen believes the state is more likely to
be severe or when she believes the competent government takes action h more often in the
severe state, she regards h less as a signal of incompetence. When x = 1 and σ = 1, we have
λσh,1 = λ0, i.e., the high action causes no reputation damage.
If the government takes action h, its expected payoff is qhλσh,0 + (1− qh)λ
σ
h,1− γ(1− qh +
c). In this case it bears the reputation cost and also imposes a cost c on the citizen, but the
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citizen is less likely to suffer from a bad outcome. If the government chooses action l, its
expected payoff is 1− γ(1− ql). In this case it bears no reputation cost, but the citizen is
more likely to suffer from a bad outcome. (From the reputation perspective, there is no the
feature of “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” in this model, but it remains from the
perspective of the government’s payoff.) The first payoff is higher if and only if
qhλσh,0 + (1− qh)λ
σ
h,1 ≥ 1− γ(qh − ql − c). (17)
Notice that the left-hand side strictly increases in σ. With this observation we can charac-
terize a unique (stable) equilibrium in the single-society case as reported in Proposition 4
below.
In the two-society case, a competent government 2 will act similarly as in the single-
society case except that its citizen has an updated interim belief on the state after seeing
what has happened in society 1. Then by backward induction we can similarly analyze a
competent government 1’s decision.
Proposition 4. In the single-society case, there is a unique (stable) equilibrium in which a competent
government takes the high action in the severe state if and only if (λ0, µ0) satisfies (17) at σ = 1;
in the two-society case, a similar result holds for a competent government 1 but for a larger set of
(λ0, µ0).
Proof. Single society. Note that the left-hand side of (17) strictly increases in σ. If the opposite
of (17) holds at σ = 1, the competent government always takes the low action in the severe
state. Then we must have σ = 0 in equilibrium. In contrast, if (17) holds at σ = 1, it is an
equilibrium that the competent government always takes the high action in the severe state,
i.e., σ = 1. If the right-hand side of (17) is positive, there is also another equilibrium where
the competent government plays a mixed strategy with σ ∈ (0, 1) which solves the equality
of (17). (Such an interior solution of σ always exists in this case since the left-hand side of
(17) equals zero at σ = 0.) However, this equilibrium is unstable in the sense that if the
citizen expects a slightly different σ, the competent government will take either the high or
the low action for sure.
Two societies. Suppose both citizens expect a competent government 1 to take action h
with probability σ ∈ [0, 1] in the severe state. If the competent government 1 takes l in the
severe state, its type is revealed perfectly. Then its expected payoff is independent of society
2 and is exactly the same as in the single-society case, i.e., 1− γ(1− ql).
If the competent government 1 takes h in the severe state and if x1 = 1, then its payoff is
also independent of society 2 since the bad outcome already reveals the true severe state. In
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this case, its reputation is λσh,1 as defined in (15). If x1 = 0, however, government 1’s expected
payoff will depend on government 2’s policy and its outcome. An incompetent government
2 will always take action h; a competent government 2 will take a deterministic action a2
as already shown in the single-society case. If x2 = 1, the severe state is revealed, and
then government 1’s reputation is λσh,1; if x2 = 0, let λ
σ
h,0;a2,0
be government 1’s reputation,
which will be specified later. Therefore, government 1’s expected payoff is qh[λ0Λσa2 + (1−
λ0)Λσh ] + (1− qh)λ
σ
h,1 − γ(1− qh + c), where
Λσa ≡ qaλσh,0;a,0 + (1− qa)λ
σ
h,1
is government 1’s expected reputation when government 2 takes action a conditional on
a1 = h and x = 0. Therefore, a competent government 1 prefers h if and only if
qh
[




+ (1− qh)λσh,1 > 1− γ(qh − ql − c) . (18)
Compared to condition (17) in the single-society case, the difference is the square-bracket
term (which was simply λσh,0 in the single-society case), and it reflects how the presence of
society 2 affects government 1’s payoff.
Notice that given a1 = h and x1 = 0, a competent government 2 will act as in the single-
society case with primitives (λ0, Th(µ0)), where Th(µ0) is citizen 2’s posterior of the state
given she believes that government 1’s strategy is σ.25 If (λ0, Th(µ0)) is in the light blue area
in Figure 4a, a competent government 2 will choose a2 = l for sure. In this case, if x2 = 0,
citizen 1’s posterior of government 1’s type is
λσh,0;l,0 =
λ0µ0σqhλ0ql











If (λ0, Th(µ0)) is in the dark-blue area in Figure 4a, a competent government 2 will choose
a2 = h for sure. In this case, if x2 = 0, citizen 1’s posterior of government 1’s type is
λσh,0;h,0 =
λ0µ0σqhqh
















> 1−λ0qh and both are less than λ0 as expected.)
When government 2 is incompetent and its high action leads to x2 = 0, citizen 1’s posterior












Given the left-hand side of (18) strictly increases in σ, the same argument as in the single-
society case implies that there is a unique (stable) equilibrium where a competent govern-
ment 1 takes h in the severe state if and only if (18) holds at σ = 1.




h,0, so that (18) holds at σ = 1 for a larger set
of (λ0, µ0) than that for (17) at σ = 1. This is true if
qa2λ
σ

























(b) Government 1’s decision in the two-society case
Figure 4: Illustration of a competent government’s decision in the reputation model: The dark-blue area
indicates the prior pairs (λ0, µ0) under which h is the government’s optimal action, while the light-blue area
corresponds to the prior pairs under which l is the optimal action. The red area corresponds to the extra prior
pairs under which h becomes the optimal action for government 1 in the two-society case.
Figure 4a illustrates a competent government’s optimal policy in the severe state in the
single-society case: it takes the first-best high action if and only if both λ0 and µ0 are suf-
ficiently high (so that the reputation damage caused by the high action is small enough),
where the boundary is determined by the equality of (17) at σ = 1. (The boundary is de-
creasing because both λσh,0 and λ
σ
h,1 are increasing in λ0 and µ0.) In particular, for a given λ0
which is not too small, the competent government takes the high action if and only if µ0 is









greater than some threshold as in our baseline model. The underlying economics, though,
is different: in our baseline model, what discourages the government from taking the high
action in the severe state is the prospect of being criticized for overreacting when a good out-
come is realized; here in this reputation model, it is because taking a high action is regarded
as a signal of incompetence.
Figure 4b illustrates a competent government 1’s optimal policy in the severe state in
the two-society case: the presence of the second society expands the range of λ0 and µ0
in which it takes the first-best high action. The intuition is as follows: Each government’s
reputation is now influenced by the action and outcome in both societies. A good outcome in
society 1 leads to a lower updated µ0 in society 2, which tends to induce a low action and so
likely a bad outcome there. A bad outcome in society 2 helps reveal the severe state. Once
citizen 1 is eventually convinced that the state is severe, she will regard its government’s
high action less as a signal of incompetence. This mitigates the reputation concern and
encourages a competent government 1 to adopt the high action in the severe state. This
result is qualitatively similar to what we saw in our baseline model.27
27A subtle difference here is that the negative sampling effect (which arises when a good outcome is also
realized in society 2) is always dominated jointly by the positive sampling and the strategic effect. This is due
to the payoff-structure difference for the government.
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